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Jean-Luc Nancy notes that the community, since it is no absolute subject (self, will, spirit), is by its nature 
not inscribed in any logic metaphysics. In spite of this, or indeed because of this, Western philosophy 
has persistently tried to interpret the community through precisely these metaphysical terms (Nancy, 
1986, page 18, La Commonauté désoevrée, Christian Bourgeois, Paris). Some thoughts about Russian 
and Japanese notions of community and space will show that characteristics pointed out by Nancy and 
Kant are binding only for societies that function within a Western intellectual framework. I want to 
introduce and compare the thought of Nishida Kitaro. (1870 – 1945) and Semën L Frank (1877 – 1950), 
who develop the notions of basho and sobornost' as alternative philosophical concepts of space. Both 
Nishida and Frank attempt to overcome what they consider a typically `Western' idea of individual `I's 
as materialized `objects'. Procedures like Einfü h- lung or intuition are inefficient because all they do 
is to transform the other, from the point of view of the ` I', into an object. Finally, for the Eurasianist, the 
state organization had at its center a personal god, and the `symphonic personality' of Russia-Eurasia 
represented a nonegoistic, communal consciousness.
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Introduction
In the 1960s, Hugh Seton-Watson explained 
to all reformers of Africa and Asia that what 
is “more beneficial to them than the ritual 
invocation of Asianism or négritude” is the “the 
study of Russian and Japanese experience [of 
reform].”1 As a matter of fact, Russia and Japan 
are not only successful reformers but also the 
first “non-western” countries that develop a 
philosophy – in the “western” sense – of their 
own and on a larger scale. Still it seems that, 
in spite of this striking parallel, no comparative 
research has been done on these two philosophical 
traditions. 
In general, both Japanese and Russian 
philosophies are engaged in the analysis of the 
relationship between faith and reason as well 
as in the critique of secularism. Concepts like 
“organicity,” “person,” and “totality” are central 
in both traditions and among the most popular 
philosophical themes discussed are reflections 
on the problem of personalism and philosophical 
developments of “intuition.” Still, while studies 
on “Nishida and Heidegger” are numerous, 
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topics like, say, “Nishida and Berdiaev” or 
“Watsuji and Trubetzkoy” have never been 
taken up for examination. The objective of 
the present article is to sketch the cultural 
similarities between Japanese and Russian 
conceptions of space through an examination 
of the Japanese notion of basho and the Russian 
notion of sobornost’. In particular, I will 
undertake a comparative analysis of the thought 
of the most important Japanese philosopher of 
the twentieth century, NISHIDA Kitarō (1870-
1945), and Semën L. Frank (1877-1950) whom 
the historian of Russian philosophy Zenkovsky 
has put forward as “Russia’s greatest Twentieth 
Century philosopher” (Zenkovsky 1995, 872). A 
comparison of both philosophers is appropriate 
because both engage in a modern philosophy of 
religion that maintains a critical distance with 
concepts of Western European Christianity. 
The originally Jewish Frank concentrates on 
Russian orthodox belief (to which he converted) 
and Nishida derives much of his most important 
insights from Zen-Buddhism.
For many intellectuals it has become almost 
obligatory to declare the commitment to any 
kind of collective – be it a nation, a caste, or 
an ethnicity – to be false because it oppresses 
those that are inside the community as much 
as those on the outside (Cf. Nussbaum 1996) 
Also, communitarianism is said to run the risk 
of creating an unacceptable relativism. I think 
that Russian and Japanese concepts of space 
and community that will be presented become 
interesting precisely here because, paradoxically, 
their reflections of community carry implicit 
statements about the international order by which 
these communities are defined. This does not 
mean that organic communities are extended over 
continents. At stake is a much more sophisticated 
idea that also finds an echo in some of those 
thoughts that have most recently entered our 
contemporary agenda. Homi K. Bhabha writes in 
The Location of Culture that at present through 
“the emergence of the interstices – the overlap 
and displacement of domains of difference – […] 
the intersubjective and collective experience of 
nationness, community interest, or cultural value 
are negotiated” (Bhabha 1994, 2). For Bhabha, the 
most interesting contemporary questions about 
“communities” are those that ask how “subjects 
[are] formed ‘in-between,’ or in excess of the sum 
of the ‘parts’ of difference…” (ibid.).
An “in-between” or “excess” produced 
through multicultural mixture as much as through 
our eminent prismatic reading of the world 
asks for a redefinition not only of homogenous 
national cultures but also for a reformulation of 
the notion of the community itself. And this also 
concerns the “supra-national community.” It is 
important to rethink the community by avoiding 
not only the “egocentric” essentialism but also 
the cooperative one.
Sobornost’ is commonly associated 
with the Slavophile A.S. Khomiakov (1804-
1860), but has also been elaborated by Sergei 
Bulgakov (1871-1944) and Nicolai Berdiaev 
(1874-1948). The untranslatable term can be 
rendered into English as “conciliarity” supposed 
to balance the relationship between authority 
and freedom. However, sobornost’ is more than 
just a “community” linking several individuals 
together.2 As a dynamic principle, sobornost’ does 
not so much describe the individual’s merging 
with or absorption by collectivity – as would do 
the obshchina (peasant community) so important 
for the Slavophiles – but rather an Aufgehen3 of 
the individual in the collectivity. It is Frank who 
developed this potential of sobornost’.
In a similar way, Nishida’s model of basho 
describes a very specific relationship between 
the individual and the community. In summary 
one can say that for Nishida, the “‘together’ of 
the most extreme differentatedness” (Weinmayr 
2005, 235). is assembled through concepts like 
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“discontinuous continuity” or “contradictory self-
identity”— concepts which are definitely not part 
and parcel of Western analytical equipment. More 
precisely, basho (as much as Frank’s sobornost’) 
eludes at least three Western social models: 
1. The Hobbesian rationalist dichotomy 
between the self and the other because 
basho and sobornost’ do not insist on 
the forces of alliances but on those of the 
community as a creative unity. 
2. The Kantian model of a “peace federation” 
(foedus pacificum) developed by Kant in 
Zum Ewigen Frieden (Goto-Jones 2005, 
795) because basho and sobornost’ 
suggest “collective spheres” rather than 
groupings.
3. Rousseauian theories of the social contract 
by putting forward a paradoxical form 
of self-actualization that leads towards 
greater unity. 
1. Sobornost’
Sobornost’ already existed in the Old Russian 
tradition and is probably the most “original” 
concept of community that Russians can think of. 
Its origin is unknown. Sobornost’ is a politico-
religious notion that gives priority neither to 
Being nor to consciousness but sobirat’ means 
simply “to bring together” and sobor means 
“council.” The apostles of the Macedonians, S. S. 
Cyril and Methodius, are believed to have tried 
to render the meaning of the Greek katholikos 
(universal) through the Macedonian Slavic 
sobornajai (Christoff: 146). Though Berdiaev 
affirms that in traditional orthodox doctrine one 
would find sobornost’ with difficulty (Berdiaev 
1925), sobornost’ is certainly representative 
of Old Slav Russian democracy present in the 
village community called the mir (Masaryk, 
1955, 14). While in Russian literature allusions to 
sobornost’ are rare before 1848 (Christoff: 139), 
the notion appears relatively frequently in the 
latter half of the 19th century as a philosophical 
tool helping to metaphysically underpin political, 
social, economic, and aesthetic positions that are 
believed to be particular to Russian culture. It has 
been reevaluated, especially by Khomiakov who 
described it as a “mystical unity of god and man” 
(Christoff: 126). After the First Slavic Congress 
in 1867, religious connotations of the sobornost’ 
receded into the background. Through its 
rootedness in certain Russian social conditions, 
sobornost’ could become a subject of sociological 
analysis. As a church of ecumenical councils it 
could be opposed to a monarchical ecclesiology.4 
As a social principle of the Russian peasant 
commune and the family (Riasanovsky 1972, 
9) providing a vision of integration, peace, and 
harmony, it could be opposed to authoritarianism 
and to individualism. As the expression of a 
purified social consciousness it could be opposed 
to the European (that is “Roman”) political 
consciousness (Christoff: 173) that has always 
been over-dependent on juridical, administrative 
and private laws. 
Many of the politico-social reflections 
on sobornost’ have been justified through 
substantialist ideas about the cultural difference 
of “the Slavic race” defined in opposition to the 
“Germanic race” with its entrenched penchant for 
limiting personal freedom by means of authority 
(while Germanic peoples need laws, Slavs manage 
“to limit the personal freedom of each member 
of the society through the moral authority of 
the unanimous will of all of its members,”5). 
Paradoxically, while freedom and unanimity 
were seen as the real essence of Slavic life, in 
the end, racial, political, and religious conditions 
of Russia pushed sobornost’ towards autarky. 
In the worst case, however, attempts were made 
to retrospectively impose religious elements 
upon certain social versions of sobornost’. Then 
sobornost’ was declared to be a sanctified original 
peasant commune (obshchina).6
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Vladimir Solov’ëv (1853-1900) rationalized 
sobornost’ until it became a sort of All-Unity. He 
questioned especially the Slavophiles’ simplistic 
identification of the Orthodox Church with the 
Russian people (Riasanovsky 1955, 193). His 
critical adoption of this concept goes in the 
direction of a philosophical anthropology that 
contradicts any egoistic self-enclosure of man 
(Berdiaev 1948, 50). When Hegelian language 
was used, moments of rationalization became 
even more obvious. Here sobornost’ could be 
openly translated as All-Unity (as has been 
done, for example, by Ivan Il’in) (Christoff 152). 
True, already in the Orthodox Church sobornost’ 
represented an “organic synthesis of multiplicity 
and unity” (Riasanovsky 1952, 162). The 
difference is that the orthodox tradition claimed 
sobornost’ as a spiritual unity of supra-personal 
and atemporal nature that comes closer to a 
religio-aesthetic consciousness than to a political 
unity.7 
2. Space in Russia and Japan
Sobornost’ becomes interesting again through 
the thoughts of the “Silver Age” philosopher 
Semën L. Frank.8 In Frank’s philosophy sobornost’ 
loses all of its autochthonous character of mir or 
peasant commune. The Japanese equivalent of 
mir is mura, both of which are traditional status 
societies and corporate entities that “distinguish 
between insiders and outsiders.”9 Frank’s 
sobornost’ is as far removed from the sobornost’/
mir definition as Nishida’s basho is from the 
mura.
Frank, who is often associated with Bulgakov 
and Berdiaev, was immensely fascinated by the 
works of the Slavophiles and Solo’viëv’s “Total 
Unity.” However, in spite of this rootedness in 
the orthodox tradition, Frank, who was exiled 
in 1922 at the age of thirty-seven, produced a 
“modern” philosophy with a clearly European 
flavor. Frank’s main focus is on the relationships 
between philosophy and psychology as well as on 
possibilities to bridge the gulf between thought 
and being. His biographer Philip Boobbyer writes 
that Frank’s “purpose was to redefine freedom in 
a conservative context (Boobbyer 1995, 146).” 
This purpose could also be attributed to Nishida. 
Another point that both have in common is that 
Nishida and Frank, who are only separated by 
seven years of age, engage in a sort of Bergsonian 
rationalist anti-rationalism which leads them 
towards conceptual redefinitions – or rather 
philosophical overcomings – of the idea of space 
and community in their respective traditions.
Much of what has been written on sobornost’ 
before Frank is reminiscent of the thoughts of the 
Japanese communitarians and agrarians who 
opposed the social structure of custom to law 
and which H. Harootunian resumed like this: 
“Japanese ‘native ethnology’ upheld an image 
of the collective body that spoke, moved, and 
acted habitually, with necessary conscious intent 
(…) internalized reflex.”10 In other words, the 
communal body was believed to function like an 
automatic organism in which knowledge was part 
of an idyllic environment.11
 Another Japanese traditional concept of 
communitarian space that Nishida had to overcome 
Nishida was kokutai. The above description of 
sobornost’ might have led a careful reader to a 
perception of parallels between this traditional 
Russian notion and the Japanese theory of 
national polity, kokutai. Kokutai has been Japan’s 
main national ideology dominant during all its 
modernization period up to the end of WWII. 
Between 1930 and 1945 kokutai has been strongly 
associated with nationalism and thought control12 
and can therefore be compared on the Russian 
side not only with the idea of “Holy Russia” or 
Russian imperial theories of the “Third Rome,”13 
but also with the traditional notion of sobornost’ 
as an organic-religious collectivism that has for so 
long been intrinsic in Russian culture and has also 
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repeatedly been exploited by authorities (Epstein 
1995, 281). However, the fundamental difference 
between the use that Nishida makes of kokutai 
in his 1944 article “On the National Polity” and 
the conception developed by orthodox nationalist 
during World War II, is that Nishida focuses 
on kokutai’s philosophical, religious, cultural 
character that, by its nature, cannot be grasped 
with the help of concrete, materialist notions (Cf. 
Botz-Bornstein 2003, 127).
3. Basho 
The idea of basho came to Nishida when 
analyzing the notion of chôra as it occurs in 
Plato’s Timaeus. Appearing as diametrically 
opposed to the Aristotelian substance (ousia), 
basho represents a new ontological category 
summarizing Nishida’s personal, Japanese 
version of the Western intuition. The notion 
appears first in the collection of essays From the 
Acting to the Seeing (Nishida 1927, 6). Though 
literally, basho means “place,” Nishida’s basho 
is rather a “negative space” in which things do 
not simply “exist” but in which they are “local”, 
i.e. in which they “are” in a concrete way. This 
makes of basho an existential place in which the 
objective world establishes itself.
In his later work, Nishida sees basho also 
as a “place” of “history forming.” The “place” 
forms an historical world that is not biological 
or material, but cultural, and science can only 
“objectify” this world by discovering intellectual 
objects, i.e. by reducing the world to noemata. 
In basho such an objectivation takes never 
place because here the world is seen the self-
determination of a socio-historical world, which 
always maintains an individual-general aspect. In 
a way, local culture “transcends itself.” 
This is one of the reasons why this space is 
cultural or “spiritual.” Through the philosophy of 
basho as a non-objectified space, “spirit” receives 
a sense of openness that makes it incompatible 
with models of totalitarian enclosure. When 
Nishida says that the “real state must be religious 
at its roots” (Nishida 1944, Engl. trans. 19) he has 
in mind the religious value of culture determined 
by the particular Buddhist idea of “self as 
nothingness.” In Fundamental Principles of a 
New World Order he writes: “Only when every 
state and every people develops itself and at the 
same time transcends itself in order to create a 
world of worlds, every single culture creates, 
following its regional tradition, a special world. 
The particular worlds that have formed itself on 
this historical foundation unite so that the whole 
world represents a worldly world (Nishida 1933-
34, 429).” More interestingly, also intercultural 
space is here created through “self-negation” (cf. 
Maraldo 1995) a problem that will be examined 
below along the lines of a comparative analysis 
of Nishida and Frank. Before doing this, 
however, it will be necessary to reflect these 
Russian and Japanese ideas against some of the 
most conventional Western ideas of space and 
community.
4. Space and Community 
Jean-Luc Nancy has recently reminded us of 
the most generalized Western consciousness that 
is “always subject to the nostalgia of an ever more 
archaic and more lost community, mourning lost 
familiarity, fraternity and conviviality.”14 Nancy’s 
observation is especially true in the sense that 
this nostalgia longs primarily for “emotional” 
elements like familiarity and fraternity. It rarely 
yearns for the lost capacity of mutual scientific 
understanding, “lost democracy,” or common 
forms of reasoning.
What comes first to mind when hearing 
of emotional ties that bind together individuals 
are not only Emile Durkheim’s or Talcot 
Parson’s social theories about the collective 
consciousness15 but also Ferdinand Tönnies’s 
(1855-1936) distinction between community 
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(Gemeinschaft) and society (Gesellschaft). In 
principle, Tönnies theory provides a relatively 
simple organicist logic (later refined by Tönnies 
himself) about the formation of states (Tönnies 
1886). While in Russia discussions of community 
and society thrived much earlier (mainly in the 
literary output of the Slavophiles), references 
to Tönnies are very frequent in Nishida and his 
Japanese contemporaries. WATSUJI Tetsurō, 
MIKI Kiyoshi and RŌYAMA Masamichi had 
elected a Gemeinschaft-like, typically “Oriental,” 
brand of community called kyōdōtai as a main 
topic for their Shōwa Research Association 
(See Fletcher 1979, 52). Watsuji defined in 
his Rinrigaku cultural, existential space as 
determined by a Gemeinschaft when writing: “As 
Tönnies has said, family bonds are realized in 
the home, neighborly unions in the matrices of 
historical tradition, and in turn they create new 
historical traditions day by day” (Watsuji 1937, 
Engl. transl. 276). 
Also Nishida uses Tönnies as a reference 
in his kokutai article when writing: “A historical 
society that actually exists does not arise in the 
manner of ‘from many to one.’ It develops in 
the form of transition from communal society 
to profit society. To use Tönnies’s word, it arises 
from an essential will, Wesenswille. And an actual 
existing society is always comprised of both 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft dimensions. It 
begins as a center that is a contradictory identity.” 
For Japan as an emerging agrarian community, 
Tönnies’ organic community could appear as 
an alternative to modern models of society. A 
minzoku (community) could be seen as a natural 
community that had not yet been mediated by the 
state, unlike the kokumin (society). However, as 
the latter quotation clearly shows, Nishida does 
not reinstate Tönnies claim for community but 
uses Tönnies’ contrasting notions in order to 
emphasize his idea of community as based on a 
“contradictory self-identity.”
Nancy’s allusions concord perhaps even 
more with a conception of the community that 
Kant suggests in Section 20 of the Critique of 
Judgment in which Kant defines the “community 
sense” (Gemeinsinn) as the human ability to 
judge according to the same “feeling” (Gefühl).16 
While Kant is here not explicitly speaking of the 
community in a spiritual-ethical-political sense, 
the reflection upon the “aesthetic sensibility” of 
individuals does still lead him to the formulation 
of something that is “common” to a group of 
people. The important point is that common 
sense (sensus communis) communicates common 
forms of cognition but that the human attitude 
towards community is not based on reason 
and understanding. Kant makes clear that the 
Gemeinsinn – and thus community itself – is a 
matter of subjectivity that transcends the feeling 
of the single person in order to become common. 
In a word, for Kant, community is not a matter 
of common reasoning but of common judgments 
about taste and ethical matters.17
Though Kant points his finger only on a 
partial constitutive component of the community, 
Japanese society represents perhaps by definition 
the ideal example of a community united through 
common judgments about taste. Roy Andrew 
Miller has written that in the 17th century, Japan, 
“in spite of civil unrest, was still united in what 
may be thought of as a fixed axis of basic taste” 
(Miller 1961, no page numbers). The expressed 
nostalgia did not always suggest replacing modern 
society with a more archaic community. While 
society has frequently been seen as a degradation 
or loss of community, “community” can also 
signify the loss of society. The advancement 
of “community” can signify the degradation of 
the free citizen who enjoys all the privileges a 
sovereign society can offer.
Nancy notes that the community, since it 
is no absolute subject (self, will, spirit), is by its 
nature not inscribed in any logic of metaphysics. 
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In spite of this, or indeed because of this, Western 
philosophy has persistently tried to interpret the 
community through precisely these metaphysical 
terms (Nancy, 18). If this is meant to represent 
a kind of Western “intellectual framework,” the 
Russian and Japanese notions of community and 
space as defined by Frank and Nishida definitely 
represent alternatives.
5. Basho and Sobornost’:  
NISHIDA Kitarō and Semën Frank 
Much earlier than Tönnies, in 19th century 
Russia, the Slavophiles18 accused rationalistic 
models of social organization based on Roman 
law of corroding the community (Kireevsky) 
and of undermining organic social totalities. 
Though Tönnies belongs to the next generation of 
social thinkers, his organic understanding of the 
community that cannot be grasped by rationalism 
comes very close to that of the Slavophiles.19 
The “supplement” the Slavophiles provide is 
that they present society as a derivative of the 
Roman “state” and see “community” as an all-
unifying totality. Tönnies’ themes, enriched by 
Slavophile-like anti-Western (anti-Roman/anti-
American) motives, recur in Japanese discussions 
of the early 20th century.20 The remarkable fact is 
that Nishida as well as Frank steer around these 
undertakings. 
In general it can be said that when Nishida 
and Frank talk about basho or sobornost’ they 
produce an intercultural philosophy from a 
paradoxical standpoint that is “metaphysical 
yet empiricist [and] that maintain[s] ties to God 
without departing from the actual world of fact” 
(Nishitani on Nishida).21 Also, they produce a 
philosophy within which, according to Karsavin’s 
formula, “the West provides the empirical 
components and the East provides the Absolute.”22 
Nishida’s focus on “emptiness” as a component 
of Japanese culture leads not to reflections on 
“the spiritual” as something abstract but to the 
consideration of “empty space.” What appears 
strange to a “Western” mind is not as unusual in 
the Russian tradition. The Slavophiles disagreed 
with the Roman Catholic and Protestant Church 
because they insisted that the spiritual content 
of religion cannot be found in the form of “pure 
spirituality” but takes place in rituals. In other 
words, the spiritual is supposed to be played 
within space in order to be a subject of interest 
for theology.
Let us start with Frank. One of the thoughts 
that are dominant in all of Frank’s philosophy is 
that God cannot be understood through analysis 
but that absolute qualities like God should be 
approached through relationships. In principle, 
Frank is a Christian democrat reflecting upon the 
fallacies of individualism in the modern world 
and uses sobornost’ to define the nature of social 
being and to crystallize the spiritual nature of 
society, a project that is both more modern and 
more sophisticated than a Tönniesian opposition 
of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Most generally 
speaking, sobornost’ is for Frank the “invisible,” 
inner, “supratemporal” part of society to which 
he opposes the visible obshchestvennost (best to 
be translated into English as “communality” and 
into German as Gesellschaftlichkeit).23
The definition of the ‘I’ as a social being 
occupied Frank for decades. Already in 1917, 
while still in Russia, Frank attempted, in Man’s 
Soul, to define the consciousness of a person, that 
is “his ‘I’ as a special reality. This consciousness 
has, for the most part, the character of a sudden 
revelation, an unexpected empirical disclosure” 
(Frank 1917, Engl. transl. 14). Man’s Soul 
abounds with quotations from William James 
and establishes psychic life as something living 
and dynamic.
In 1930, eight years after his emigration 
to Germany, Frank published The Spiritual 
Foundations of Society,24 in which he characterizes 
sobornost’ as “the primary inner unity, a 
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primordial multi-unity, [a] specific form of being” 
(69). In this book Frank concentrates on the ‘I’ 
in the context of the formation of a social “we,” 
which culminates in a description of sobornost as 
“the indivisible unity of ‘I’ and ‘thou,’ growing 
out of the primordial unity of ‘we’” (63).
In 1939, in his most mature work, The 
Unknowable (which translator Boris Jakim has 
called “possibly the greatest work of Russian 
philosophy of the Twentieth Century,” ix), 
Frank revisits the theme of the ‘I’ and the 
‘thou’ and offers even, in a special section of 
the book, a very systematical treatment of the 
topic. Though sobornost’ is not mentioned 
in this context, Frank describes the “we” as a 
collective in which the individuality of the ‘I’ is 
conserved: “The being of ‘we’ overcomes, even 
if it also conserves, (in the dual, Hegelian sense 
of aufheben), the very opposition between ‘I 
am’ and ‘thou art,’ the opposition between ‘I’ 
and ‘thou’” (149).
In Spiritual Foundations Frank lays the 
ground for these thoughts by concretely linking 
them to sobornost’. Frank holds that the nature 
of social being “can be adequately expressed 
neither in purely ‘subjective’ categories nor in 
purely ‘objective’ categories. Social being in its 
nature transcends not only the ‘material-psychic’ 
antithesis but also the ‘subjective-objective’ 
antithesis. It is subjective and objective at the 
same time (…)” (79). It is in this sense that 
sobornost’ becomes for Frank an important term 
when it comes to the definition of social being. 
The primordial multi-unity of sobornost’ should 
not be mistaken for a sociological model of 
interaction (72).25 Being itself is a concrete total-
unity whose essence can be grasped by neither 
naturalism nor idealism nor positivism (100). In 
the same way also social being (the ‘we’) is more 
than only a subjective synthesis, that is, more 
than a derivative unification of many ‘I’s.’ Frank 
expresses deep resentments towards organic 
theories of social life whose “naturalism” shares 
all the inconsistencies of naturalism in general 
(43). For Frank, “paths in forests and fields do not 
arise because many individuals have agreed to 
make them, but because individuals separately – 
one after the other – go into a certain direction 
(…)” (37). 
It is in this context that parallels between 
Frank’s and Nishida’s definitions of cultural space 
become most explicit because the definitions of 
both Nishida’s basho and Frank’s sobornost’ are 
linked to parallel treatments of the relationship 
between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou.’ In his essay “The 
‘I’ and the ‘Thou’” Nishida declares that “a mere 
isolated individual is nothing at all” which means 
that the ‘I’ exists only through its relationship 
with the ‘Thou.’ More precisely, the ‘I’ exists in 
order to bring about and to maintain the ‘Other-
ness’ of the ‘Thou’ on the one hand; and in 
order to grant the ‘I’ its quality as an ‘I’ on the 
other. In this sense ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ “flow out of 
the same environment” and are determined by a 
“common consciousness” (Nishida 1927, 348). 
Any cultural environment flows out of such kind 
of interaction.
Nishida’s environment that is constituted by 
an interrelationship of the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ is 
not an organic model of social interaction. The 
reason is that Nishida strongly objects to the idea 
of a socio-historical world as a fusion of different 
individual bits of consciousness. For Nishida, 
the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ do not simply merge in 
order to create an environment, a society, or a 
place. On the contrary: within the environment 
they create, they remain ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ through 
mutual recognition. Nishida writes about intuitive 
processes that apparently help to understand the 
other: “Intuition – of which the model is normally 
thought to be artistic intuition – does not mean 
that we are immediately united with things. It 
is rather that deep down inside us resides the 
absolute other, so that at the bottom of its self, 
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the self has to become the ‘Other’” (I and Thou, 
390).
Also Frank is convinced that “if ‘I’ and the 
subject of knowledge coincided in the sense of 
complete identity, I could never encounter other 
beings like me” (47). 
There must be something like a ‘Thou’ 
because…
…another ‘I’ for me is not merely an object 
that I know and apprehend but also a subject 
who apprehends me. In communion, another 
consciousness is for me what is expressed 
grammatically as ‘thou,’ the second person 
pronoun. But what is ‘thou’ if we analyze it 
in terms of abstract epistemology? It is also 
another consciousness which I apprehend as 
apprehending me (48). 
Only through the interaction of the ‘I’ and 
the ‘Thou’ can society, as the experience of 
the ‘we’ that it is, create itself. The ‘we’ is not 
derivative of the ‘I’. Nor is it the sum or aggregate 
of many ‘I’s but it is “rather a primordial form of 
being, correlative to ‘I’” (51).
For Frank the unity of ‘we’ resides in the 
primordial unity of multiplicity itself. It resides “in 
the fact that the very multiplicity of individuals 
can live and act only as the self-revelation of 
the unity which embraces and pervades this 
multiplicity” (52). The unity of society exists 
“as the consciousness of communality that is as 
the idea of ‘we’ in its individual members” (45). 
Should these individual members really fuse into 
an organic community, this consciousness of 
communality would cease to exist. “Knowledge 
of another ‘I’ and a living meeting with this other 
‘I’ are possible only because ‘I’ primordially 
seeks this meeting” (49).
Frank perceives a mirroring effect of the 
‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ when he states that “even as 
two mirrors facing each other give an infinite 
number of reflections, so the meeting of two 
consciousnesses – understood as mutual external 
apprehension – presupposes an infinite number of 
such apprehension” (48). Also for Nishida the ‘I’ 
and the ‘Thou’ determine each other even before 
any reflection takes place: “‘I’ and the ‘Other’ 
do not become one here, but I am asked to see 
in myself the absolute other. This might be an 
unthinkable contradiction” (Nishida 1932: 390). 
Frank declares that “‘I’ ideally has a relation 
to ‘thou’ before any external meeting with a 
separate ‘thou.’ This ideal relation to ‘thou,’ 
constitutes the very essence of ‘I’” (49). Nishida 
holds that the contact between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ 
creates a “self-consciousness” that is based 
on social consciousness instead of on simple 
perception. This means that the “place” created 
by the relationship between the ‘I’ and the Other 
represents a kind of “play of reflection” in which 
the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ are not opposed to each 
other.
Both Nishida and Frank attempt to overcome 
what they consider a typically “Western” idea 
of individual ‘I’s as materialized “objects.” 
Procedures like Einfühlung or intuition are 
inefficient (Frank, 48) because all they do is to 
transform the other, from the point of view of the 
‘I’, into an object.26 Nishida writes:
Even if we adopt an intuitive point of view 
that will be thought as the unity of subject 
and object, consciousness will not be detached 
from the general-conceptual; on the contrary, 
we attain thus the utmost of the general-
conceptual. […] If intuition means nothing 
more than that there is neither subject nor 
object, it is no more than an object. As soon 
as one talks about intuition, one has already 
distinguished the knower and the known and 
again reunited both (Nishida 1926: 222).
Frank concludes along the same lines: 
If even ‘he,’ i.e., another consciousness as 
a pure object, turns out to be an impossible 
category for the point of view for which the 
world breaks down in ‘I’ and ‘not-I,’ then 
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how much more impossible or unexplainable 
must be for this point of view the concept of 
‘thou,’ the concept of the member of living 
communion who stands opposite to me (49).
Once these objectified entities have been 
established, they can be fused into organic 
communities. Another way to say this is to 
suggest that Western sociology has scheduled 
“social being as belonging to the domain of 
psychic life” (Frank, 71).27 Through Descartes’ 
cogito, Western philosophy became able to view 
the ‘we’ as a similarly individual quantity as the 
‘I’: “Starting with Descartes, modern Western-
European philosophy views ‘I’ as the bearer 
of personal, individual consciousness, which 
cannot be compared with anything else and 
embraces everything else” (Frank, 46). Against 
this materializing tendency Frank holds that 
“social life is not material but spiritual” (71). 
There is neither cogito nor knower but only “self-
consciousness.” This last thought represents for 
Frank the ideal definition of sobornost’.
Also for Nishida the ‘I’ does not represent a 
firm subjective basis into which, within the process 
of understanding, the ‘Other’ can be integrated 
through assimilation. Since the “fusion” of ‘I’s 
into a community is not an empirical fusion 
in the sense of empathy or abstract scientific 
theories, Nishida’s decides to avoid such a fusion 
by opposing to the cogito the idea that “I know 
you because you answer me, and you know me 
because I answer you” (Nishida 1932: 392). Both 
Nishida and Frank are convinced that man lives in 
society not because many individuals have joined 
together. Something in man’s essence determines 
him to be a member of society. Sobornost’ is 
constituted by, and at same time constitutive of 
individuals. It is concretely individual without 
being a subject of consciousness separate from 
society. Nishida expresses the same paradox by 
saying that society develops itself out of itself as 
a center that is a contradictory identity. 
In both philosophies the notion of “place” 
is supposed to explain what eludes scientific 
definition. Nishida’s basho is not a Hegelian 
organic whole (a community or a nation) but 
a “self-determinating world” which cannot be 
examined from a scientific point of view because 
science views society and history as intellectual 
objects. Basho creates its own structure from 
the inside and thus represents an “infinite 
unity” in the sense of unformed matter that is 
still full of potentialities. For Nishida, the peak 
of philosophical achievement is neither the 
definition of the state as a moral substance, nor 
that of the community as a cultural substance, but 
the religio-aesthetic definition of a place as the 
perfect unity of opposites.
In an almost identical way Frank puts the act 
of differentiation at the center of the formation of 
the ‘I’ and the Thou:’ “‘I’ itself is first constituted 
by the act of differentiation, which transforms a 
certain fused primordial spiritual unity into the 
correlative connection of ‘I’ and ‘thou.’ But what 
is this primordial unity? It is nothing else but the 
principle that is grammatically expressed in the 
word ‘we’ (Frank, 49).” The being called ‘we’ is 
supported by no original nuclear element called 
‘I’ nor by an all-uniting organic structure called 
‘we.’ All there is is difference between ‘I’ and 
‘Thou’.
Nishida’s approach is more extreme as he 
uses the idea of “nothingness” as a self-expressive 
element flowing out of a similar process of 
differentiation. Certainly, all cultures, époques 
and states have a definitely individual character; 
but the place in which they create themselves is 
not entirely “positive,” it is not the expression 
of fixed – Deleuze would say “biologically 
determinable” – elements, but it flows out of 
“nothingness” as a differentiation active between 
the elements themselves. Emptiness as an 
absolute absence of form permits the “place” to 
accommodate contradictions without resolving 
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them. In this sense the “place” is an open ended 
“horizon.”
6. Transversal Contacts between  
Frank and Nishida
Some of the reasons for the striking parallels 
between Nishida and Frank are inscribed on 
another level of comparative philosophy, a 
level that needs to be pointed out because the 
encounter of Nishida and Frank is far from 
being hypothetical and constructed. Nishida’s 
philosophy has been continued in the area of 
psychology by the eminent Japanese psychologist 
Kimura Bin (born 1931) who studied in Germany 
with Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966). Like 
Binswanger, Kimura is deeply dissatisfied with 
the orientation of psychology towards the natural 
sciences. It happens that Binswanger was Frank’s 
closest Western-European friend by whom he 
was supported for years whilst in emigration and 
in whose house he lived.
Like Frank’s, Kimura’s psychological 
writings are lengthy meditations about the 
status of the “I” as opposed to the empirical 
self. His idea is to evaluate Nishida’s idea of 
pure experience in the context of psychoanalytic 
theory, criticizing that for Western schools of 
psychotherapy psychic experience represents 
always a verbalizable experience and “even non-
verbal phenomena like dreams [and] transfers [...] 
can be entered into the field of psychotherapy, to 
the extent that they can be translated into words 
either by the patient himself or by the therapist” 
(Kimura 1991, 191, my translation) Verbalization 
is materialization of psychic experiences. In 
Western psychoanalysis, Kimura concludes, the 
patient is obliged to make his consciousness an 
object in order to construct his psychic life (1991, 
200). In the same way, psychology proceeds to the 
materialization of the ‘I’. Kimura insists that the 
‘I’ should be seen as a non-substantial entity that 
exists only by “reporting itself to itself” (Kimura 
1982, 7, my translation) and declares self-
perception ( jikaku) the original place of human 
existence: it is through self-perception that man 
resists all “objectification” of psychic life in order 
to perceive the Being of things “immediately” 
(Kimura 1992, 40, my translation). 
It is clear that this strategy fully coincides 
with Frank’s thoughts though we have no reason 
to believe that Frank developed them only under 
the influence of Binswanger. Already in his pre-
emigration work (Man’s Soul) from 1917 Frank 
writes: “Psychic life is not a mechanical mosaic 
consisting of psychic stones called sensations, 
ideas, etc. (…) but a kind of unity (…)” (17-18) and 
suggests the “delimitation of psychic life from 
objective being” as an element of experience 
which leads him to the accentuation of inter-
relational space. The exclusive existence of the 
“I” within an “inter-relational” space concords 
not only with Kimura’s Nishidaian ideas but also 
with Binswanger’s for whom this space has been 
a topic of interest as he writes:
[…] the curious problem that just where you are, 
“arises” a place (for me). Instead of ceding a 
position “to the other” within the predetermined 
spatiality of the ratio and the corresponding 
loss of my own space, what appears is the 
curious phenomenon of an “unlimited” 
increase of one’s own space by giving away 
one’s own space! Instead of a predetermined 
region as such in which the one would dispute 
“the place” or “the position” to the other, one 
perceives a curiously undetermined […] depth 
[and] breadth in which places and positions no 
longer exist.28 
7. Basho, Sobornost’,  
and the Eurasianists’ “New Globalism”
Through the notion of basho Nishida 
resolves the aporia of the co-existence of 
existence and essence. Reflecting all individuals 
and their mutually determining way-of-being 
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within itself, basho is a place in which all living 
and non-living things come into being, it is a 
“place” of relational existence in which one 
perceives the idea of nothingness or emptiness. 
On the basis of this religious “negativity” 
introduced into the idea of community, both 
basho and sobornost’ positively engage in 
reflections on the global world order. Nishida’s 
theory of the basho is opposed to federalism 
as well as to imperialism but brings forward 
a new globalism within which each nation 
is supposed to develop its own culture. This 
theory avoids ethnic egoism as well as any 
harmful form of nationalism and comes close to 
Sergei Bulgakov’s concept of a “brotherhood of 
peoples” (Bulgakov 1986, 44) which Bulgakov 
preferred to “nationals, atomized ‘citizens’ or 
‘proletarians of all countries’.” 
Nishida’s later developments of basho are 
also reminiscent of the “community of nations” 
(sobor narodov) of the Eurasianists,29 for whom 
the Aufgehen of the individual in the collectivity 
had been important. In general, Eurasianist, who 
formulated perhaps the clearest anti-Western 
model that has ever existed in Russia, adopted 
“organic” tones well known since the Slavophiles 
and Pan-Slavism. They also formulated a critique 
of Western philosophy as well as reflections on 
Khomiakov’s idea of sobornost’ together with 
impressive degrees of cultural relativism and anti-
colonialism.30 Curiously, these rather conservative 
thoughts are combined with distinctly progressive 
ideas about the organization of a multicultural state 
as laid out by the liberal conservative economist 
Pëtr Struve (1870-1944), a friend of Frank who 
was, like Frank, a proponent of political realism. 
Though Struve certainly entertained a Slavophile 
“nostalgia for the precapitalist world” (Pipes 
1980, 78), his ideas were clearly Western and 
European.
For the Eurasianist, the state organization had 
at its center a personal god and the “symphonic 
personality” of Russia-Eurasia represented a 
non-egoistic, communal consciousness or, as 
expressed by Karsavin, a collective personality 
(“sobornaja lichnost’”). For the Eurasianists, 
any relationship between individual and state is 
rooted in sobornost’. However, in spite of their 
conservative and paternalist background, it is 
possible to see in the Eurasianist writings an 
“early post-modernist strain” (Girenok) because 
their idea to identify Eurasia as a localized culture 
pushes the very opposition East-West towards 
theories of cultural conversion or transculturalism. 
Especially the democratic and decentralized 
“third way” that left-wing Eurasianists like 
Dimitry Sviatopolk-Mirskii suggested, aims at 
overcoming Russian nationalism and emphasizes 
the supra-national character of Eurasianism.31 The 
Eurasianist geographer Savitzky, for example, 
introduced the idea of the “symposium of people” 
when writing: “Eurasianists understand Russia 
as the sobor narodov. They believe that political 
unity of this vast territory is a result not only of 
the efforts of just Russian people but of many 
peoples of Eurasia”32 The sobor narodov can be 
understood as an “internationalized” version of 
sobornost’. For the Eurasianists there would be 
a large quantity of “local patriotisms” sustained 
by a weak, all-Russian patriotism of the elite. 
“Eurasian culture” would not simply be the sum 
of different single cultures but these cultures 
would “converge” into a symphonic reunion. 
This is compatible with Nishida’s suggestion 
that a “new world order” can be attained via the 
typically Japanese idea of “self as nothingness:” 
just as individual selves exist by mutual self-
determination and self-negation, so do nations in 
global place.
The Eurasianist Nicolai Trubetzkoy held that 
culture migrates, that its centers constantly change 
in geographical space. Under the influence of the 
botanist Danilevsky, Savitzky refused to divide 
the world into clearly defined continents in order 
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to avoid “natural classifications” following the 
natural lines of oceans, mountains, etc. Instead 
Savitzky suggested the term “geographical 
worlds” in which characteristics can overlap 
(Savitzky 1927, 27. See Wiederkehr 2000, 135). 
The unity of Eurasia, for example, was supposed 
to be not “natural” but rather based on a model 
of convergence: “The influence of South, East, 
and West constantly alternated and consecutively 
dominated the world of Russian culture” (Savitzky 
1925, 8). Cultures are no “undifferential entities” 
(nedifferenzirovannij sovokupnosti) (ibid, 13): 
without Tartars there would be no Russia (Savitzky 
1922, 123) and Russia itself is a combination 
of sedentariness and steppe elements (ibid). 
Unilinear and progressive evolutive systems 
become impossible: “When the line of evolution 
extends itself into different branches, there can be 
neither an ascending movement nor gradual and 
constant self-accomplishment. This or that cultural 
milieu or series [of milieus] is an accomplishment 
from one point of view but looks like a decline 
from another point of view” (“Evrasijstvo,” 13). 
Savitzky also introduced the term mestorazvitie 
(space-development), a theoretical notion through 
which socio-historical components or even 
literature and art can be seen as integral parts 
of geographical conditions. The individual, not 
unlike the personality, is supposed to appear as 
a “geographical individual” (Savitzky 1927, 30, 
31). Interestingly, the notion of mestorazvitie as 
a “natural milieu” avoids determinism because 
there is no “predestination” (see Weidlé  1976, 16). 
Later, the Eurasianist historian George Vernadsky 
(1887-1973) gave historical flesh to Savitzky’s 
geographical theories by stressing “the decisive 
significance of the relation between steppe and the 
forest societies on the enormous Eurasian plain, 
the ethnic and cultural complexity of Russia, 
and the major organic contribution of Eastern 
peoples, especially the Mongols, to Russian 
history” (Riasanovsky 1972, 23). Eurasia as a 
combination of spatial-temporal “undifferential 
entities” as well as Nishida’s vision of Asia as a 
basho is a “place” that is not shaped by profound, 
metaphysical structures.
Conclusion
I have shown in which way certain “non-
Western” concepts of community like sobornost’ 
or basho differ from Kant’s idea of “community” 
as they manage to include – though at the same time 
fracture – metaphysical items like “self,” “will,” 
or “spirit.” This shows that the Kantian definition 
of the community as dependent on nothing other 
than subjectivity has no absolute value. The “non-
Western” alternatives that have been presented 
should be considered as a useful addition to our 
contemporary political discourse. Former Czech 
president Vaclav Havel explained only recently 
that “I merely reject the kind of political notions 
that attempt, in the name of nationality, to suppress 
other aspects of the human home, other aspects of 
humanity and human rights.”33 The dichotomy of 
reasoning against feeling, of the rational against 
the familiar, of the modern against the archaic, 
persist in our thinking. The Russian and Japanese 
authors dealt with in the preceding study reject 
such dichotomies and try to think the community 
on the basis of principles of convergence in which 
the relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ is 
no longer inscribed in these schemes.
Further, the reading of the Russian and 
Japanese authors that has been provided in the 
present article helps to overcome Huntingtonesque 
fear of a clash of civilizations. Also Christopher 
Goto-Jones affirms that Nishida’s “alternative 
model of the inter-civilizational order predates 
Huntington’s ‘new world order’ by some sixty 
years” (Goto-Jones 2002, 224). The difference 
is that Nishida’s civilizations manage to avoid 
the Hobbesian clash because they are not 
material entities. While it remains true that 
the world is an unfolding of various types of 
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civilization (as Nishida also would affirm), each 
of these expressions should be recognized as an 
immediate expression that cannot be subsumed 
in one single Hegelian idea of “civilization.” In 
other words, every singularity is an expression 
of the Absolute, and the “harmony” that Frank 
and the Eurasianists look for when talking about 
sobornost’, is always more than a totalizing 
Hegelian universalism but comes closer to a 
Schellingian revelation.34 There is no dialectical 
synthesizing but rather the expression of a 
general truth.
More important than to theoretically 
define the limits between different types of 
Pan-associations (or perhaps pondering about 
ways to harmonize single cultures by imposing 
upon them some sort of holistic spirit), is to 
show ways how these limits can be and – as a 
matter of fact – constantly are overcome. It is, 
for example, more important to think about the 
relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou,’ about 
the formation of human communities dependent 
on the contact with the “outer” world (or simply 
arising through opposition to it), than to define 
“civilizations” as self-sufficient and egocentric 
entities. 
Contemporary discussions on the “new 
world order,” at the moment they ground their 
arguments on “cultural” elements, on the other 
hand, can easily shift towards a Huntington-style 
cultural essentialism. In Nation and Narration 
Homi Bhabha argues against this tendency 
to essentialize Third World countries into a 
homogenous identity (Bhabha 1990). At the 
moment a world order is no longer established 
“artificially,” i.e. with the help of valid political 
ideas, cultural components are called for in order to 
establish an “organic” order by creating coalitions 
between cultures in an almost “natural” way. Such 
ideas accord with historical ideas of Nishida or of 
Eurasianism only as long as we take a superficial 
look. The present article was supposed to show 
that these Japanese and Russian philosophies 
developed concepts of space through which 
cultural communities appear as more than merely 
organic, self-enclosed units. These philosophies 
constantly confront the contemporary reader with 
a paradoxical conceptual linking of openness and 
closedness, of self-awareness and awareness of 
the other, of reality and transcendence. Like this 
they manage to overcome both particularism and 
universalism.
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Japan and Russia (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), 129ff and 197ff. Quotation from page 278.
10 Cf. Harootunian H, 2000, 299-300. Representatives of native ethnology are Gondō Seikei, Tachibana Kōsaburō, Inoue 
Nisshō, and Nakano Seigō.
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bestimme, was gefalle oder mißfalle. Ein solches Princip aber könnte nur als Gemeinsinn angesehen werden, welcher vom 
gemeinen Verstande, den man bisweilen auch Gemeinsinn (sensus communis) nennt, wesentlich unterschieden ist: indem 
letzterer nicht nach Gefühl, sondern jederzeit nach Begriffen, wiewohl gemeiniglich nur als nach dunkel vorgestellten 
Prinzipien, urtheilt.”
17 “Also nur unter der Voraussetzung, daß es einen Gemeinsinn gäbe (…) kann das Geschmacksurteil gefällt werden” 
(157).
18 ‘Slavophilism’ has two meanings, depending on if it is used in Russia or in Slav countries outside Russia. In Slav countries 
outside Russia, ‘Slavophilism’ is a generic term for all pro-Slav movements, including Pan-Slavism. In Russia, Slavophilism 
is restricted to certain thinkers. I will talk here about Slavophilism in the “Russian” way. The main representatives of 
the Slavophiles are Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856), Alexei Khomiakov (1804-1860), Ivan Aksakov (1817-1860), Konstantin 
Aksakov (1817-1860), and Iurii Samarin (1817-1886). The Slavophiles were a group of Russian intellectuals who defined 
the values of Russian civilization as independent from Western-European culture. Russian Pan-Slavism adopted certain 
themes of the Russian Slavophiles though it did not consciously overtake Slavophile ideals. Still, Slavophilism can be seen 
as the precursor of Pan-Slavism, because it is the first movement coming to terms with questions of Slav cultural identity. 
The problem is rather that the Russian Slavophiles manifested, in general, no solidarity with the Western Slavs (apart from 
the period of the Crimean War) and developed their themes into a kind of imperial “Pan-Russianism.” This is especially 
true for the period following the war against Turkey (mid 1870s) where ideologies became racist.
19 Also Tönnies felt that “organic reality” couldn’t be grasped by rationalism (Walicki 1975), page 170.
20 Tönnies himself was influenced by conservative German philosophers like Justus Möser and Adam Müller who agitated 
against French rationalism around 1800 which brings him indeed temporally close to the Slavophiles which shows that 
the problem of Japan’s transformation from a people to a nation reached the Japanese consciousness relatively late (Naoki 
Sakai even holds that only Maruyama’s Studies of Tokugawa Japan brought up this problem). See Epstein K, 1973, Die 
Ursprünge des Konservatismus in Deutschland (Ullstein, Berlin).
21 Nishitani K, 1991 Nishida Kitarō (University of California Press, Berkley). It is interesting to note that Nishitani held such 
a standpoint to be “unthinkable in the West.”
22 Karsavin L P, 1922 Vostok: Zapad i russkaja ideja (Ogni, Petrograd) quoted from Mehlich, page 108.
23 See von Schelting A, 221: “The obshchina rested on the principle of obshchinnost (communality).”
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24 Frank 1930. I quote from the English translation. The book’s section “I and We,” part of the book most discussed in the 
present article, appeared as a separate article entitled “I and We” in the Collection of Essays in Honor of P.B. Struve 
(Prague) already in 1926.
25 “In other words, the spiritual unity considered here is not the simple, absolute unity of a subject, but precisely a multi-
unity, a unity that exists and acts only in harmony and unitedness of many individual consciousnesses” (45).
26 “Another consciousness as a pure object, turns out to be an impossible category for the point of view for which the world 
breaks down into ‘I’ and ‘non-I,’ then how much more impossible or unexplainable must be for this point of view the 
concept of ‘thou,’ the concept of the member of living communion who stands opposite me?” (Frank 1987, 49). “This 
unity of ‘we’ is not only a unity that opposes multiplicity and separation, but it is also, primarily, the unity of multiplicity 
itself, the unity of all that is separate and antagonistic, the unity outside of which no human separation and multiplicity are 
conceivable” (51).
27 Frank 1987, 71 “This is the absolutely insuperable limit to all social materialism, to all attempts at a biological or physical 
interpretation of social life.”
28 Binswanger L, 1953 Grundformen und Erkenntnis des menschlichen Daseins (Niehans, Zürich), page 31, my translation. 
A more direct contact between Nishida’s philosophy and Frank does not seem to have existed. Kimura Bin never met 
Frank (correspondence with the author).
29 Eurasianism emerged in 1921 and its principal representatives are the linguist Nicolas S. Trubetzkoy, the geographer 
Pëtr Nikolaevitch Savitzky, the theologian Georgy V. Florovsky and the musicologist Pëtr P. Suvchinsky. A creation of 
émigré intellectuals, Eurasianists interpret the Revolution of 1917 as the point where Russia left the European world. 
Their general tendency is to emphasize religious and metaphysical questions, which enables them to establish Russia (like 
Byzantium) as an amalgam of European and Asian elements, and to see the existence of “Slavic culture” as a myth. For 
“sobor narodov” see Sergei Glebov: “Science, Culture, and Empire: Eurasianism as a Modern Movement” in Slavic & East 
European Information Resources 4(4), page 16.
30 It comes as a poor coincidence that Eurasianism has recently been revalued by the nationalist geopolitician Alexandr Dugin 
who refounded the Eurasian Movement in 2000. Dugin calls his movement also “radical traditionalism.” The conclusions 
he draws from his “theory of passionarity” are that Russians are a fresh and young ethnos, which has the potential to 
consolidate the super-ethnos of Russia-Eurasia (cf. Galya Andreyeva Krasteva: “The Criticism towards the West and the 
Future of Russia-Eurasia” in The Eurasian Politician, July 2003 4.) Eurasianism continues to fascinate theorists. The 
reason might be that “Eurasia” represents an interesting object for various kinds of people. The American policy-maker 
Brzezinski claims that even today “Eurasia is […] the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be 
played.” Zbigniev Brzezinsky. The Grand Chessboard – American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: 
Basic Books, 1997), 31.
31 See Torbakov I, 2003 “From the Other Shore: Some Reflections of Russian Émigré Thinkers on Soviet Nationality Policies 
1920s-1930s” in Slavic & East European Information Resources 4(4). Torbakov quotes Mirskii from “National’nosti 
SSSR” in Evrazija (Paris) 22, 1929 (44).
32 Savitzky P, 1995, 424, quoted from Torbakov page 44.
33 Havel V, 1991, “On Home” in New York Review of Books 5 December. Quoted from Griffin.
34 Schelling’s philosophy of revelation (“Philosophie der Offenbarung,” a lecture held in 1854) defines philosophy as a 
science transcending mere rational knowledge. Whatever philosophy creates can be perceived only through experience 
and revelation. Three forms of revelation of the absolute are: art, religion, and philosophy.
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Философские концепции культурного пространства  
в России и Японии:  
сравнение философии Нисиды Китаро  
и Семёна Франка 
Т. Ботц-Борнштайн
Университет стран Персидского залива 
по науке и технике, 
Кувейт, 32093 Хавалли, п/я 7207 
Жан-Люк Нанси отмечает, что общество, не являясь абсолютным субъектом (я, воля, дух), 
по своей природе не вписывается ни в какую логическую метафизику. Несмотря на это или по 
причине этого, западная философия настоятельно пыталась интерпретировать общество 
исключительно при помощи этих метафизических терминов (Nancy, 1986, page 18, La 
Commonaute¨  de¨ soevre¨ e, Christian Bourgeois, Paris).
Некоторые размышления о российских и японских понятиях об обществе и пространстве 
показывают, что характеристики, данные Нанси и Кантом, типичны только для тех 
обществ, которые функционируют в рамках западной интеллектуальной концепции. Мне 
хотелось бы сравнить позиции Нисиды Китаро (1870-1935) и Семёна Л. Франка (1877-1950), 
которые разработали понятия «басё» и «соборность» в качестве альтернативных концепций 
пространства. Как Нисида, так и Франк пытались преодолеть то, что они считали 
«типичным западным представлением об отдельных «я» как материальных «объектах». Такие 
процессы, как интуиция, являются неэффективными, потому что они лишь трансформируют 
в объект то, что им является по мнению «я». Для евразианиста организация государства 
сконцентрирована вокруг персонального Бога, а «симфоническая индивидуальность» России-
Евразии представлена неэгоистичным, общим сознанием.
Ключевые слова: Нисида Китаро, Семен Франк, Басё, соборность, философия космизма, 
сравнение русской и японской философии.
